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Introduction

The purpose

of this

study is to provide

framework for the analysis

of the competition

European Economic Community (EEC).
demonstrate

that

the EEC's actual

business

practices

relevant

and adequate

policy

parallels

objective

on competition

restrictive

of J.A.

that

is

of competition

theoretical

regulation

by the

is to

of competition

a strong

between EEC business

in the theories

implemented

and expla n ation

is that

economic

to regulating

to a concept

for the analysis

in the EEC. The thesis

policy

The fundamental
approach

can be related

can be shown to exist

a theoretical

relationship

and the conceptual

Schumpeter

and J.M.

Clark.
A United
legislation

States

Congressional

determined

facilitate

that

the control

proscription
structures
competition

1

policy

The finding

regulate

competition

policy

principle,

which base their

statutes

Competition

of abuse principle
than laws that

. enterprise

market

affecting

practices

of dominant
competition

legislation

mandates

a significantly

are based upon the
common basis

principle

are prohibited

for rules

are that

which

per se,

certain

and in addition,

or monopoly power is proscribed.
policy

which

activities.

of the prohibition

business

the acquisition

principles.

which is the other

anti-competitive

The properties
restrictive

not the

or concentrated

that

to

in the European community are based upon the control

is founded upon the control

prohibition

antitrust

are designed

practices,

practices

implies

international

rules

enterprise

business

of abuse of power competition

different

into

EEC competition

of abusive

of restrictive
per se.

inquiry

upon the prohibition

1

2

Countries

of per se

principle

do not usually

potential

social

States

a case-by-case

or economic benefits

competition-distorting
Richard

require

mitigate

Leftwich

asserts

legislation

for evaluating
theory

that

of perfect

principle

practices.

competition]

public

policy

policy

like

provides

"Presumably

regulation

it

of

the norm
[the

and enforcement

of public

utilities

3

competition

is credited

for the prohibition

a theoretical

enforcement

the philosophy

measures."

economic justification
to develop

in their

He states,

underlies

Since the model of perfect

necessary

of

such as the United

competition

of the Sherman Act of 1890 ••• , government

underlying

the economic costs

for countries

the model of perfect

business

and many other

of whether

practices.

which employ the prohibition

antitrust

determination

with being the
principle,

economic rationale

it

is

for competition

the EEC's, which is based upon the control

of abuse

principle.
The essence
is that

of the control

restrictive

positions

can be rationally

beneficial
is based

business

of abuse of power competition

practices

4

agreements,
efficiency

activities

which limit

requirement

is that

consumers.

Basically,

criterion
arrangements

allows

the benefits
under this

for determining

and policy

exemptions

between

to produce

the most socially

legislation

when restrictive
competition

or are likely

to achieve

Competition

upon the abuse principle

anti-competitive

or firms with dominant market

overseen

use of resources.

principle

from prohibitions

business
firms,

practices

be shared

type of competition

the acceptability

is economic performance,

and

A further

with ultimate

policy,

the

of anti-competitive

and not merely .the existence

2

on

enhance economic

new or improved products.

which result

that

of

concerted

practices

or concentrated

carry

out competition

order

to determine

society

if

outweigh

important

factor

possibility

policy

must therefore

the existing

effects

which is included

some of the short-run

which
logic

economic benefits

of less

on this

improvements

Authorities

employ a balancing

or potential

the detrimental

of long-run

mitigate

economic power.

competition.

economic balance

in production

imperfections

to

An

sheet

efficiency

of restrictive

in

is the

that

might

business

practices.
The theories
foundation

of competition

in economic theory

of Schumpeter

for the control

competition

legislation

and policy.

implemented

by the EEC are exemplary

theoretical

economic model can be presented

explanation

of competition

policy

and Clark provide

a solid

of abuse principle

Further,

the rules

in

and policy

of the principle.

Thus, ,,a unique

for the analysis

and

in the European Community.

The Literature
Several
competition
action

studies
policy.

effort

that

Typically

as a function

if any,

exist

present

they explain

of pragmatic

is exerted

plausible

EEC legislation

socioeconomic

to relate

rationales

.policy

for EEC
and regulatory

considerations.

and practice

Little,

to a theoretical

economic model.
Angulo and Minshall
United
business

States

that

and the EEC by theorizing

practices

nationalistic

(1964) explicate

is determined

economic concern

the economic needs necessitated
development

affect

that

objectives.

on the basis
5

the focus of a nation's
3

in the

stages

of
of

The authors -speculate

for geopolitical

by various

policy

the acceptability

by authorities

economic and political

the national

competition

economic power and
of economic

competition

policy.

The study's

findings

the EEC, the advantages

indicate
of industrial

economic needs more suitably
Minshall
desire

conclude

that

that

as a

result

favorable

fear of large

have influenced

cooperation"

trade

of firms
general

advantages

of antitrust

encouraged.

The view holds

large

each industry.
industrial

multinationals,

profits

for utilizing

has significantly

change from wholesale
arrangements

that

are set up as

is that

firms

the

should be

competition

firms

are necessary

the development

in

of large-scale

corporate

technological

financing,

progress.

of highly

they suggest

1970s EEC policy

concentrated

for additional

less-than-blanket

acceptance

4

the

EEC policy.

in the early

to guarded enthusiasm
of ·this

The "economic

with industries

large

concept,

influenced

approval

which

of the EEC Commission and Court of

the cooperation

Clock and Lee maintain

.school

as lower-cost
foster

are

market power.

of thought

to promote effective

of promoting

are critical

6

associated

protected,

which should

policies

in the EEC.

typically

are envisioned

the authors

philosophy

schools

a few monolithic

The benefits

structures

and increased

that

and the lack

economic philosophies

of the cooperation

of economies of scale

by the

expanding

EEC regulatory

.

action

have small numbers of stable,

indication

to the EEC

the rapidly

regulation.

to

Angulo and

with significant

EEC business

The economic philosophy

J ustice

balance,

and "economic moderation"

detenninants

Although

competition.

firms in Europe,

toward the existence

they assert

between

respond

of the economic needs created

Clock and Lee (1975) present

that

is applied

in the CommonMarket at the time of the research,

of inherent

partial

concentration

than unfettered

in the EEC to improve its

economies

when the theorem

began to

industry

concentration.
of cooperation

The

agreements

was the EEC Statement

exempted agreements
product

market

of May 27, 1970.

between firms with

from competition

moderation

impacted

The findings
competition
benefits

that

created

that

scale

set

results

and implied

postulate

that

to achieve

economies offer
of trade.

"creative

.is necessary

and Clark's
similar,

explanation

of EEC competition

competition

expressed

underpinnings
restrictive
that

business

effective

1. static
business

competition

policy.

action

practices:

technologies,

2. long-run

can mitigate

and 3. competition

optimal

a more

economic and

Model
theory

competition"
into

stresses

are inappropriate
dynamic factors,

should

5

costs

theoretical

the control

The two mainstream
if

are isolated,

of capitalist

and Clark provide
that

of

a framework for -the

The visions

the immediate

policymakers

effects

that

of Schwnpeter's

can be achieved

models of competition

between the

from EEC policy.

and integrated

practices.

of economic

to measure the impact
if

"workable

by Schumpeter

for regulatory

to the

who deal with

Clock and Lee conclude

the main currents

shown to be remarkably

agreements

with the anti-competitive

are to be ascertained

destruction"

the logic

a balance

have on net market efficiency

section

that

EEC authorities

The Schumpeter-Clark
In this

o~ _their

policy.

of economic criteria

agreements

social

now attempt

5 percent

would have to be notified

of the study are that

by restraints

specific

the authors

EEC antitrust

matters

than

legislation

between firms with more than 5 percent
.
.
7
EEC Comm.J.SSJ.On. Thus,

less

The statement

of

economists

society

contend

recognizes

that:

norms for assessing
e.g.,

new products

or

of restrictive

practices:

employ a case-by-case

evaluation

of anti-competitive
benefits

activities

to facilitate

for European

model is formalized,

Community competition

Background of Creative
Competition
creative

8

the inevitability

1942 publication

of the emergence of a socialist
The theory

facilitates

the prediction

of capitalism's

indicative

of the rationalist

mentality

Basically,

capitalism

develops

which propels

the logic

rationalistic

attitude

and undermines
Schumpeter
creative

rationality

of enterprise.

capitalist

of creative

of the

destruction
it is

in the system.
calculus
of the

which eventually

because

competition

continuous

is envisioned.

Incessant

attacks

as old methods and products

existence

destruction,

of creative
requires
.production
an enti~ely

firms

new product

of the old and creation
of enterprise

output.

survival

to perpetually

methods;

or service.

strive

business

place

inside

are supplanted
In light

by

of the

to:

1. develop more

quality;

and/or

The systematic

of the new has important

6

takes

of

in the arena of capitalist

2. improve product

activities.

as a process

change from within
revolution

and differentiated

regulation

economy because

and the cost-profit

mindset

improved technologies

efficient

is to demonstrate

However, a by-product

is a critical

describes

and industries

competition

Capitalism,

demise because
inherent

of

the economic system.

destruction

enterprises

as a process

of the treatise

society.

power

and Workable Competition

system is presented

The purpose

of capitalist

· explanatory

is demonstrated.

Destruction

in Schumpter's

and Democracy.

decomposition

policy

in the capitalist

destruction

Socialism

create

and economic

of dynamic progressiveness.

Once the Schumpeter-Clark

firms

the social

implications

3.

destruction
for the

The impetus

for J.M. Clark's

competition

is much different

indifferent

to the overall

disintegration
a response

of effective

than Schumpeter's.
question

Clark

of the continued

of modern industrial
to the perceived

imperfect

explanation

societies.

intellectual

is virtually

existence

Instead

shortcomings

capitalist

his analysis
of the theories

of Clark's

effective

competition

appear

of

in his

1940

" 9 He states

paper ent1t. l e d . ' Toward A Concept o f Workabl e Competition.
· ·
his

is

competition.

The principles

that

or

article:
••• is an attempt to find an escape from the negative
conclusions
stemming from the Chamberlin-Robinson
group of
theories,
in which it appears that all feasible
fonns of
competition
in industry
and trade are defective,
fran the
standpoiflt of the services
competition
is supposed to
render.

The predominant
is to encourage
competition,

from those

acceptability,

that

that

theory

of realistic

are inescapable.

of the firms

possible,
Further,

of an industry

economic analysis

of workable

and desirabie

are practically

or workability,

of careful

the behavior

of Clark's

the development

set by conditions

the basis

ob j ective

competition
concepts

within

the limits

he emphasizes

should

which make up the industry;

that

be determined

of the structure

of

the
on

of the industry;
and industrial

performance.

Views of Static
A fundamental
and workable

competition

of the competition
perceives

principle

the old vestiges

in both the process

is an emphasis

process.

is characterized

Models

of competitive

economy that

Schumpeter

change from within

advantages
7

destruction

on the dynamic characteristics

The capitalist
by incessant

of creative

and crating

- destroying

new ones.

Schumpeter

stresses

of competition

that

such a process

which account

Similarly,

Clark maintains

psychology

of economics,

perspective.

for the impact

that

mechanistic

economic activity,

that

assert

determination

by changing

Schumpeter

of how capitalism

never has been and never will

attempt

requires

that

static

point

process

about

in time.

to manifest

economic performance

its

true

He

since

it

features

takes

He states

to be an

institutions

such analysis,
performance

considerable

and effects,

and

of ·capitalism

of its

capitalist

reality

capitalism

To facilitate

to - evaluate

.over time.

11

of this

explains

the interpretation

Rather,

existing

the functioning

Once Schumpeter

is pointless

which is directed

one which is

who use fragments

conclusions

economic system,

it

benefits

from within.

dynamic methods of analysis.

argues

social

be stationary.

process,

revolution

of theorists

observations.

ever-changing

an overly

as "a form or ·method of economic

as an evolutionary

to generalize

from limited

capitalism

by incessant

He is critical

aimed at

create

administers

change" that

characterized

possible

with economic theory

He defines

capitalism

models,

equilibrimn,

structures.

describes

from a dynamic

economic conditions.

is not satisfied

toward the mere analysis

as well as the

precisionist

of static

over time.

be analyzed

view of the economy and overlook

made possible

models and theories

of innovation

should realistically

Both economists

the mathematical

necessitates

it

he

from a

time for the

is better

to judge

that:

A system - any system, economic or other - that at every given
point of time fully utilizes
its possibilities
to the best
advantage may yet in the long-run be inferior
to a system that
. does so at no point in time, because the latter's
failure
to
do so may be ~ condition for the level or speed of long-run
performance. 1

8

In order

for society

dynamic progressiveness
an enterprise
quantity

features

that

organization.

existed,

it would not result

He declares

that

result

inability

than the price

upon in static

he argues

models.

the existence

of perfectly

in wasted opportunities

Schumpeter

fallacy
is that

new products

that

if perfect

competition

use of resources

competitive

•.

firms would most

because

of their

of new methods of production

of the model of perfect
it assumes easy entry

enter

economic profits

the field

acquired

competition

into

and

business

to the model of perfect

attempt

profits

to maintain
13

the process

surplus

However, Schumpeter
of capitalist

is not only impossible

evolution,

competition

for competition
of imperfect

are eliminated,
Any

to growth of total

the necessity

of such profits
"perfect

and has no title

in

competition

to being set up as

1114

view, neither

models of imperfect

recognizes

competition.

and adds that

but inferior,

.
a mod e 1 o f i'd ea l e ff' iciency.
In Clark's

is "inimical

stresses

firms may not

He also
strategy

to

Yet, when

are introduced,

of competition.

through

according

any industry.

or competed away, according

theorists

In

and new types of

and resources

or new methods of production

be able to readily

guidelines

and

investments.

Another

output.

of

must include

in the ·most efficient

to judge and take advantage

profitable

other

new products,

Further,

from the

the performance

measure of competition

to new technologies,

industrial

to benefit

competition,

on factors

are focused

view a realistic

contributions

that

of capitalist

must be evaluated

Schumpeter's

likely

to have the opportunity

the model of perfect

competition

nor the

expounded in the 1930s are appropriate

policy.

competition

· Nevertheless,
for their

9

he applauds

attempt

the

at making economic

models more relevant

to modern experience.

on the effects

of large

firm size,

differentiated

products

is pertinent

that

an analysis

mathematically
leads

using graphical
precise

character,
limitations

emphasis

However, he asserts

of stable

He states

that

of mathematical

to which these

dynamic economic situations

and

of which the aim and end is the

of a state

realism.

on the extent

of actual,

and useful.

models,

plus the requirements

their

small numbers of producers,

definition

away from increased

He believes

equilibriwn,

"this

static

precision

••• impose

models can reflect
and the forces

the behavior

that

operate

on

th em. ,.15
Clark

deals

of imperfect

primarily

competition

he does state

that

with the fallacies
developed

reliable

closest

working approximation

He charges
progress

that

guidance

to the factors

equilibrium

by assumption.

inescapable

by Chamberlin

the use of the standard

"afford

of that
conditions

in the models

and Robinson.

of perfect

under

of perfect

actual

cannot

to the

conditions.

competition

the model brings

However,

competition

which are favorable

ideal

In his view,

conclusion,

he perceives

forth

1116

eliminate
an

namely:

••• this allegedly
desirable
condition
is something nobody
really wants, including the theorists
whose models impliedly
set it up as a desideratum.
They do not want techniques to be
static
or diversity
of products to be wiped out, and complete
homogeneity of product' would threaten
competition
worse than
differentiation
does.
Clark's
the absence

critique

of dynmnic considerations

the pessimistic
that

it

control

predictions

is quite

possible

over prices

and reliable

of Robinson and Chamberlin's

which Clark believes

of imperfect
that

works focuses

competition.

firms with market

competition.

10

ameliorate

He points

out

power and a measure of

can perform well enough to be considered

forms of actual

upon ·

adequate

The long-run,
unfavorable
output

results

predicted

potential

of higher

than competitive

by models of monopolistic

products.

He notes

of offsetting

concert,

fundamental

tendencies,

proposition

and much more elastic

considerably

more elastic
of theories

derives

from ••• the exaggerated

innovation

because

suggest.

is possibly

inevitable

in the capitalistic

in regard

itself.
that

in Clark's
to price,

in

and

Clark

states

Chamberlin's

that

he

results

he used to

over time represents,
in more elastic
that

in Clark's

demand schedules
theories

of

In a comment on the importance
Clark points

the most formidable

the existence

tha t the development

enterprise,

curves,

of the curves

of imperfections

suggests

The awareness

steepness

of Schumpeter,

can threaten

form of competition

of Professor

which results

competition
reminiscent

it

competition.

of substitutes

the seriousness

between .substitutes

in

18

a dynamic factor

monopolistic

that,

demand and cost curves

than short-run

seriousness

The development

and reduces

is individually

check on such activities.

is that

of imperfect

"the

them."

number of

than the ones used in the diagrammatic

expects

illustrate

apparent

are the

but he submits

to a perfect

the · long-run

expositions

factor

the

and restricted

competition,

neither

monopolistic

mitigate

prices

and an increased

that

they might comes close

Clark's

view,

which Clark believes

for both more competition

substitute
capable

dynamic forces,

of an entire

of substitute
economy that

out that

competition

kin d of rivalry
industry.

He

goods is so pronounced
it

of

should

and

be viewed as a

,

potential
opinion,

competition
from pursuing

and an unduly restrictive

11

can materialize
an "unduly

prevents

grasping

po l icy as to output."

policy
19

Clark

insists

that

preoccupied

that
that

short-run

businessmen

attract

of Clark's

as totally

of profits.
perfect

Although he

foresight,

are aware that

new competitors.

position

is that

to one which explains

position

the emphasis

of competition

competition

as a mechanism

as a dynamic process.

is accepted,

it is possible

to understand

"competitive

forces

more pervasively

presumption

that

effectively

than existing

theories

he

substantial

must be changed from one which views competition

of equilibrium
If this

maximization

in industry

eventually

The essence

businessmen

do not possess

decision-makers

profits

theories

models portray

with the short-run

recognizes
believes

static

persist
typically

assume."

his
and

20

The Impact of Dynamic Economic Factors
Schurnpeter
products,

and Clark maintain

or commodities

of better

advanced methods of production
effects

of short-run

of competition

that

decisive

cost

in their

view,

strike

generates

The process
reduces

the long-run
pattern.

21

Schumpeter's

these

advantages

of creative

levels
that
Several

position

tenable
that

that

society.

Schumpeter

optimum.

arguments

insists,

In fact,

to the perfectly

are presented

anti-competitive

12

techniques

significant

of market power and ultimately

since

Furthermore,

or production

of firms with

is very similar

the type

is the most desirable

in products

near the competitive
behavior

as compensatory

They insist

are afforded

destruction,

over time of new

or more technologically

results

and very lives

the concentration

and output

quality,

practices.

such improvements

at the foundation

the development

should be acknowledged

restrictive

or quality

that

power.

unremittingly

produces

price

he suggests
competitive

to j ustify

arrangements

have redeeming

in

social

and economic features.

restrictive

practices

materialization
sufficient
that

a new meaning.

He asserts

that

the

of the threat

of new products

and technologies

is

aim, through

suggests

the "long-run

restricting

and at maximizing
that

restrictive

destruction

acquire

to reduce

positions

In the gale of creative

practices

scope and importance

output,

at conserving

the profits

accruing

which appear

may do a great

expansions

and contractions

restrictive

arrangement~

of business

failures.

of business
prevent

established
Also,

he

case to be

the ship"

cycles.

resource

22

from them."

in the individual

deal to "steady

of practices

during

the

In particular,

dislocation

some

and large

numbers

He states:

we may assume that the refusal
to lower prices strengthens
the
position
of the industries
which adopt that policy either by
increasing
their revenue or simply by avoiding chaos in their
markets ••• it may make fort
23sses. out of what otherwise might
be centers of devastation.
In other

words,

maintain

total

possible

if

Also,
incessant

output

complete
because

price

flexibility

Schumpeter

protective

measures.

to insure

the continuation

conditions

of capitalism.

may be able to
than would be

capitalism

as a system of

of innovative

competition

a.s imperative

- he
for

order.

considers

technique

levels

and strategies

which constantly

and techniques,

Schumpeter

of production

- a sort

of the system,

of new commodities

control

exist.

describes

devices

in the capitalist

The nature

of price

and employment at higher

change from .within

views certain
survival

firms with some degree

necessitates
patents,

information,

and long-run

of investment
He points

restraints

the introduction

certain

protective

on the dissemination
contracts

under the constantly

out that,
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induces

in reality,

as essential
changing
such

generally

accepted

practices

the class

of restrictive

are not different,

practices

held

only special

in such contempt

cases,

from

by theorists

and politicians.
He admits
statically

that

if restrictive

vis-a-vis

detrimental

a model of perfect

to social

utility

quantities

of output.

strategies

or practices

of expansion

judged

because

of higher

of the capitalist

than impeding

they . appear • to be

maintains

or smaller
that

these

of a long-run
system.

are viewed from this

rather

are viewed

prices

should be viewed as part

practices

as protecting

activities

competition

However, Schumpeter

and development

if restrictive

enterprise

process

He suggests

perspective

that

they can be

economic and technical

progress.
Another
inevitably

reason
restrict

enterprises
it

output

"largely

is irrational

output

that

is unacceptable

create

firms

with market power

to Schumpeter
1124

what they exploit.

talent

to crea.te

when they produce

new products.

is that

such

The argument is that

to condemn firms with the financial

entrepreneurial
total

why the conclusion

ability

or

These enterprises

expand

the new or improved commodity which they

have developed.

The process
strategies
vision

of creative

of firms.

Since innovation

of capitalist

ess .entially

competition,

a short-run
of prices.

calculus

which drives

and forces

phenomenon.

capitalism

method which reduces

prices

down.

In other

.also

has an impact on the price

is indigenous

he avers that

1125 He explains

rigidity

or production

destruction

to Sch~peter's

"price

rigidity

There are no instances
that

the rational

eventually

brings

the market
words,
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of long-run

cost-profit
forth

power of its

the process

is

of

a new product
competition

creative

destruction

are passed

insures

similar

anti-competitive

t hat businessmen

He further

argues

levels

expl~ins

static

that

the constant

Clark points

out that

expand their

output

of imperfect

highly

short-run

and sales

elasticity,

price

and

Thus, he
than

of new competitors
and output

believe

strategies

are

is more farsighted.

it

is good business

avoid

demonstrated

are the product

to

"unduly grasping"

to ·c1ark.

demand schedule
competition
that

the demand schedule

by Chamberlin's

of the exaggerated

demand according

in his view,

infinite

products

and ever present

volume and, thus,

results

impact of potential

force

demonstrate.

of substitute

compe,tition.

and

•

of a timeless

long-run

price

many businessmen

product

possible,

competition

to behave in a manner that

competition

the abstraction

of perfect

is

price

and, consequently,

the probability

derogatory

used to illustrate

increasing

that

~trategies

. The serious,

so it

26

sellers

profit-maximizing

Clark contends

short-run

introduction

is "more pervasive

when restrictive
forces

restrictive,

models of imperfect

to the ideal

of

by J.M. Clark in his

new competitors

demand schedules

Business . awareness

pursued

the highly

competition

conunonly believed."

increases

i nnovation

the acceptability

In his famous article

that

close

that

is reached

competition.

in more elastic

output

practice

pursue

strategies

results

of technological

regarding

want to avoid attracting

they will

output

to Schumpeter's

business

of workable

unlikely

the fruits

along to consumers.

A conclusion

concept

that

He states

that

the elasticity

and substitute

goods.

of these

for most products
or eliminates

15

steepness

neglects

the effects

and thus reduces

model

factors

to approach
the difference

It is
in the

between price

and output

the perfectly

competitive

workable

competition

short-run

results

Although

levels
ideal.

reduce
so that

no specific

price

control

are:

and product

times,

Innovations

imperative
alleges

provide

productive

"affords

sloped

and cost

because

of

progress
a stimulus

of

demand curve is seen as

of innovation.

Actually

or improvements

in quality

the accompanying

Clark

competitive

in the industry

or to increase

to

27

improve the performance

a stimulus . for others
efficiency

is considered

characteristics

in boom times."

and the inherent

competition

con~rol

flexibility

or products

and

are achieved.

reward for the technological

and the reverse

of

by Clark to judge the

The positive

and 2. price

of

the conditions

the "ideal"

of price

the advent of innovations

effective

advantages
their

allows

to reward the risk

that

enhances

it

to

and those

between long-run

are presented

competition.

in technology

competition,

closer

some degree

development;

demand in dull

imperfect

1.

to Clark,

the discrepancies

standards

to effective

competition

According

levels

abuse of economic power,
beneficial

of imperfect

to improve

the attractiveness

of their

product.
The ability
curves

also

submits

produce

that

times

slope

cost

so that

and bad."

positive

28

prices

to bring

use for the sloping

will

in the long-run

"an individual

on the average,

cost may be covered

Thus, he concludes

that

individual
that

sloped demand

for the economy.

requires

price,

average

by negatively

benefits

competition

In swmnary Clark maintains
sellers

implied

stabilization

effective

with sufficient
marginal

to affect

Clark
demand curve

far enough above

over the run of good

workab1e competition

has some

demand curve.
competition

approximate

16

between even a few

the results

of perfect

competition,

and short-run

restrictive
these

price

and output

outcomes because

and output

strategies

expand their
short-run

sales

levels

try

in considerably

than theorized.
businessmen

Essentially,

dynamic,

of short-run

capita l ist

results

regulate

business

long-run

long-run

most effective
advanced

development.
practices

practices

to stimulate

Finally,

may afford

Consequently,

First,

it

is their

position

submits

"from the new ·comnodity,

the new type of organization
instance)

- competition

and the outputs
very lives.
acceptability

which strikes

He maintains

of enterprise

of price

but at the .ir

competition
positions

policy

o·f these

17

dynamic .

are evaluated.
the most is
of supply,

of control

for

of the profits

foundations

should

and activities

and

to society.

the new source
unit

is

.restrictive

not at the margins

fims

control
research

which counts

(the largest-scale

of the existing

1129

activities

the new technology,

as the

technological

the effects

the competition

that

is stressed

benefits

when business

that

in decisions

over the long-run

that

views of

and Clark's

a degree

economic stabilization

must be estimated

· schumpeter

Policy

and reward

they contend

the

competition.

innovation
Next,

must be

which mitigate

consideration

kind of competition.

as necessary

and that

factors

effects

in Schumpeter

which require

enterprises.

rivals,

under imperfect

themes exist

competition

pursue price

- even at the expense of

The Role of Competition
Three parallel

rationally

to have a system of workable

of ever-changing

It is these

less

Clark predicts

to avoid attracting

volume and market share

compet i t i on the effects

seriousness

result

he believes
.that

profits.

considered.

practices

decide

on their

and their
the
ability

to

contribute

to the development

considerations
ships

other

than static

are important.

social

welfare

technical

Factors

contributes,

like

He defines

Schumpeter,

of things

asserts

of innovation
it does;

that

substitutes

science

Clark

of the

facilitate

technological

conditions"

it

progress

argues

substitutes.

arrangements
industry.

that

of increasing

However, he contends

that

characteristics

of fairly

healthy

Clark

hope that

in these

expresses

also

of
-

between

firms might

be considered

in Clark's

competition

of closer

between

and more

such anti-competitive
the co:ncentration

and workable,

18

Furthermore,

industry.

reduce

large-scale

cases

that

it necessi-

kind of competition

agreements

of

the new

th .e developnent

conceivably

He recognizes

creates;

30

creates.

they promote the introduction

have the effect

Clark believes

of an entire

should

the import

sponsorship

facilitates

cooperative

Although the agreements
Clark

to the competitive

does.

the new organizational

the existence

that

of innovation.

emphasizes

it may promote the most formidable

The possibility

general

as

manner

development

is in the new forms it

when innovation

which can threaten

firms,

of applied

dynamic economy.

and the new "enabling

opinion.

in this

the importance

in much the same way as Schumpeter

the significance

that

to

are identified

to the organic

recognizes

it as the utilization

innovation

Clark

or contributions

of policy

of a thoroughly

tates;

of increasing

The implementation
opinion,

relation-

economy.

Clark,

kinds

such as the likelihood

of supply

in Schumpeter's

In his view,

of price-quantity

or an improved source

worthy considerations.

forces

comparisons

from new or improved products,

progress,

capitalist

of the economy over time.

production
imperfect

government

will

of
has the
competition.

•not assume the

burden

of doing something

about every departure

from the model of

. .
"31
per f ect compet1t1on.

Schumpeter was avidly
attacking
maintain

the existence
a price

against

of significant

greater

without

considering

strategies

play

in the process

competition

enterprise

activities

not argue against
is possible

accomplish

all

state

for a cartel

the same results

and private

costs.

no general

that

The type of regulatory
regulatory
a vindictive
concerning

not uncritically

authorities
competition
how a rational

condemning indiscriminate

practices,

illegal

per se.

policy

trust-busting

that

Although

and restrictive

the social

and economic benefits

he observes

progress

that

or to

with smaller

social

shows "that

there

32

Schumpeter

advocates

a rational

no explicit

detail

for

instead

practices

that

concentrated

should be regulated

of innovation.
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of

is given

can be implemented_, the statement
implies

is

or for the prosecution

of trade."

is what he calls

trust-busting

industries

all

he believes,

philosophy

all

However, Schumpeter does

competition

as a restraint

that

to long-run

For instance,

as perfect

policy.

which may

as an argument against

system to sabotage

to pursue

practices

are injurious

regulation.

and

He admits that

assume that

can be interpreted

to

business

However, he contends

This possibility,

qualifies

or restrictive

business

output.

case for indiscriminate

of everything

(the ability

such positions,

anti-competitive,

This position

which emphasizes

of economic devel0:pment.

should

which appear

development.

it

the role

to long-run

authorities

practices,

ruling

cost)

are some cases of anti-competitive

prove detrimental

ideology

market power

than marginal

practices

there

antitrust

to facilitate

The most precise
promote effective

elaboration

competition

of the competition

is made by J.M. Clark.

a case-by-case

method of determining

satisfactorily

meet competition

authorities

to employ.

differentiated

products,

in the relevance
analyzed

is extended

that

and price

analysis

of many diverse,

to the criteria

He maintains

enterprise

a balanced

all

necessary

techniques,

necessitates

realistic

for identifying

that

approach

evaluation

play a part.

to

activities

is the appropriate

of productive

of pragmatic

in light

whether

criteria

He notes

is "one in which the aspects

policy

for

of competition

improved and

1133 Clark's
that

belief

behavior

variables.

be

When such logic

effective

competition

he

states:
••• the case-by-case
type of study does not mean that the
concepts of general theory play no part.
They are used and
useful.
But it does mean that no one or two such concepts can
be counted on to dominate a particular
situation;
and that the
facts of the case must be appealed to in trying to decide how
important any one factor is.
To put it briefly,
the concepts
of theory suggest some of the things a student should look
for; but he also needs to be 1ooking for other things and be
prepared for the unexpected. 3
The approach

that

Clark

advocates

legality

· of enterprise

activities

desirable

and those

judged harmful

calls

the prohibitionary

implementing
defined

policy,

and firms

Therefore,
competition
of substantial

but observes

that · it

approach

policy

judged

a negative

their

He

method of

if offenses

are

violations.

under Clark's

attack

the

standpoint.

has some ·value

what to do to rectify

competition

of practices

from a competitive
policy

would not automatically

the acquisition

theory

of

or existence

market power.

The theories
competition

on the basis

antitrust

are told

appropriate

is one which determines

provide

of the two economists
a theoretical

on effective

capitalist

framework for the economic analysis

20

of

competition
market
their

policy

structures
concepts

policy

which does not automatically
or restrictive

of acceptable

which utilizes

and market

control

The next

section

representative

use of economic power,

competition

indicates

of this

of enterprise

Competition

of

for competition

a basis

if imperfections

contributions.

and Clark's

The principles

establish

of power, . is theoretically

Schumpeter's

practices.

evaluation

to determine

of the abusive

or acquisition

competition

a case-by-case

positions

economic or social

business

condemn concentrated

practices

can make positive

policy

directed

at the

and not at the existence

rationalized

on the basis

of

theories.

that

EEC competition

policy

is

type of approach.

EEC Competition

Policy:

Theory and Practice

Introduction
The rules
competition
section

policy

relevant

statutes

competition

cases

are examined.

rationalized

precedents

to control

Community.

the Treaty
The Treaty

Ireland,

that ·EEC

the abuse of economic power,

countries,

and

model of

France,

of Rome and established
came into

force

on April

Denmark, and Greece have joined

The EEC extended
and Steel

indicate

of

•

signed

Britain,

will

of

in this

The analysis

by the Schumpeter-Clark

March 25, 1957, -~he Benelux

On

Italy,

designed

the implementation

Community are presented

and •important

is primarily

is consequently

which facilitate

in the European

and several

competition
policy

and regulations

.

the common market

Community by abolishing

quotas

21

principles

Germany; and

·the European Economic
1, 1958.

Since 1958,

the Conmmnity.

.

of the European Coal

on goods and services,

by

eliminating

obstacles

creating

to the free movement of people

institutions

competition

rules,

rules

(Articles

Paris

Treaty.

with supranational

the ECSC set the precedent

85 and 86) by establishing

The importance
Rome Treaty.

of effective

Article

"institution

free

35 Articles

public

enterprises

in the Camnon Market

85 and 86 are perceived
realized,

In other
trade

to be necessary,

to prevent

competition

are eliminated.

where national

words,

barriers

private

Articles

85 and 86

and abusive

which would .otherwise

prevent

trade

practices

of

or distort

among member states.
aim of the EEC is to eliminate

and to form a vast
provisions

single

are inte'bded

advance the

"four

market for all

barriers

goods.

trade,

Thus, competition

to promote the accomplishment

freedoms:"

to free

of these

freedom of movement of goods,

goal _s and

services,

and capital.

The Commission of the European Economic Community, after
from the Committee on Competition,
objectives

in the

competition

to eliminate

The basic

persons

out early

that

private

trade

is set

of a system ensuring

barriers

powerful

65 and 66 in the

the Community must promote the

of power from restricting

are designed

for Community competition

that

as both Schuman and Monnet had earlier

and tariff

In the area of

Articles

~ompetition

and

3(F) states

is not distorted."

accwnulations

powers.

and capital,

of EEC competition

has issued

policy.

a statement

advisement

of the basic

They state:

The first objective
is to help create and maintain a single,
common market for the benefit of business
and consumers: it
has been felt from the outset that the market which the Treaty
aims to establish
would be made impossible
if, while conventional trade barriers
among the member states were speedily
reduced, obstacles
to trade resulting
from private
agreements
and abuses of d011linant position
were allowed to remain.
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The second objective
is to prevent
abusing their economic power.

large

companie •s from

The third objective
is to induce firms to rationalize
production
and distribut!gn
and to keep up with technical
scientific
developments.
The objectives
policy

specified

by the Commission indicate

in the EEC is concerned

the modernization

with the encouragement

of industry.

of concerted

practices

proscription

of restrictive

The statement

competition

of investment

suggests

and economic power is preferred
practices

that

and

that

and

regulation

over complete

or the existence

of a dominant

position.

EEC Competition
Regulation

17 was adopted

1962, and came in force
Council's

response

effect

to "adopt

effect

to the principles

adoption

of a coherent

prejudiced

agreements)

set out in Articles

85 and 86."

86 that

the evaluation
against

authorities

of Articles

39

have special

in the first

features

23

38

Prior

to the
were

for a "comprehenand enforcement

states

that

"some

which may make them less
40

Thus, the

to implement Articles

practices

of competition.

to give

application

The preamble

regulation

went into

in member states

17 .is to provide

of the common market."

of enterprise

the degree

was the

85 and 86.

for the uniform

policy.•

6,

87 of the Rome Treaty

or directives

to the development
recognized

The Regulation

from the time the Treaty

of Regulation

competition

of the EEC on February

regulations

machinery

Council

objectives

years

37

of Article

17, competition

function

administrative

[restrictive

three

for the application

The basic
sive

March 13, 1962.

any appropriate

of Regulation

responsible

by the Council

to the mandates

which gave the Couricil

Regulations

must balance

85 and

economic

The Regulation
to investigate
also

complaints

establishes

exclusive
concerning

procedures

are contemplating
Treaty.

confers

entering

agreements

covered

by Article

Articles;

or if

the Conmission

into

an agreement

the Comnission

it

can qualify

feels

there

violation

of the Treaty,
exemption

agreement

range

Failure

units

on a daily
Decisions

Upon the review
jurisdiction

is in

of Article

85(3),

exemption

it has the power to declare
agreements

an

European currency
firms'

in fines
units,

previous

or
the

with EEC rules,

can result

or to

which may

or a sum of up to

year's

turnover.

The

of from 50 to 1,000 European currency

for non-compliance.

However, the Court will

an essential

if

than a negative

an agreement

an individual

by the Commission are subject

can be shown that

violated

that

practices

levy fines

basis

Court of Justice.
it

to align

of the participating
may also

85(3).

can be granted.

from 1,000 to 1,000,000

Conmission

of the

under Article

of the Treaty,

but it meets the criteria

anti-competitive

ten percent

is in fact

is a violation

that

the

of reviewing

if the agreement

If it determines

is not warranted,

invalid.

discontinue

is capable

is no violation

It

which may violate

for an exemption

When the CODmlission determines
clearance

activities.

the Comnission when they

85 or 86; if the agreement

can be issued.

negative

anti-competitive

and determining

clearance

individual

upon the EEC Comnission

for fir:ms to notify

Upon notification,

enterprise

authority

to review by the European
hear

the Commission has exercised
procedural

requirement,

of a Commission decision,

to "cancel,

reduce,

24

or misused

the

only when

a lack of competence,
its

the Court of Justice

or increase

.
d "41
pena l ty impose.

such appeals

fine

powers.
has the

or periodic

In the SAFCO (72/23)
recognized

that

competition

and CHEVRON(75/95)

enterprises

had entered

in the produce

retailing

However, based upon the facts
found that

trade

and issued

a negative

into

it

between ~ember states
clearance,

the Commission

agreements

and oil

before

cases

which restricted

refining

industries.

at the time,

the Commission

was not substantially

i.e.,

no violation

restricted

of the Treaty

existed.
Regulation

17 authorizes

the EEC Commission as the only institution

in the Common Market capable

of issuing

competition

85(1).

rules

of Article

exemption

under the conditions

indicative

of the discretionary

Article
adhered

enterprises

which prevent,

member states

declared

that

practice

logic"

individual

exemption.

of reason"

approach

AJ'l

of proof

Paragraph

must be
(1) of

practices

between
between

that

the prohibitions

if .the agreement
the production

or distri-

or economic progress,
benefit

or

•••• "

while
42

85 the Commission must ~ploy

if restrictive
process

which has developed

does not rest

that

with the CommonMarket.

85 mandates

The evaluation

difference

rule

competition

share of the resulting

to determine

important

or distort

to improving

to implement Article

"balancing

85(3) is particularly

or concerted

technical

an individual

to the Commission.

(1) may be inapplicable

a fair

to grant

the first

as incompatible

"contributes

consumers

In order

burden

restrict,

of goods or to promoting

allowing

law.

agreements

(3) of the Article

in paragraph

concerted

all

presents

exemption from the

in the Corrmon Market.

are prohibited

However, paragraph

bution

powers granted

to by firms co~peting
states

The ability

set out in Article

85 of the Rome Treaty

the Article

an individual

practices

warrant an

is analogous

under United

a

States

to the "rule
antitrust

in the CommonMarket is that

the entire

entirely

seeking

on the undertakings
25

the

exemption

from competition

Grunding-Consten
extent

of its

individual

(64/566)
resources

of Article
there

The Court of Justice

case that

if

there

83 (3).

85 (1) is determined,

are sufficient

decided

in the

the Commission must use the full

to establish

exemption under Article

violation
whether

rules.

grounds

are grounds
In every

for an

case that

a

the Commission considers

for issuing

an individual

exemption.
In effect,

the approach

legislated

under Article

Commission to draw up an "economic balance
actual

or potential

concerted

practices

traditional
ability

loss

to control

the entry

of powerful
of competitors

development.

Also,

arrangements
Virtually

firms

firms

costs

and to limit

or anti-competitive
and/or

Dl\lSt be carefully

costs

whether
single

from restrictive

considered

before

the

social

to restrict

of a unified

may be the

i.e.;

agreements

the Commission must determine

or

the quantity

which could increase

in the future

of the possible

costs
to

or potential

economy must be entered
hypothetical
reduce

of reducing

on the social

"economic balance

competition

benefit

sheet."

between producers

user prices

beneficial

improvements

technological
anti-competitive
market.

enterprise

an arrangement

between

or increasing

for the CommonMarket
side

Obviously,

of the Commission's
agreements

but have a considerable
product

to the Community.

26

supply

are

limit

can be authorized.
The realized

highly

factors

undermine the objectives

all

agreements

other

the

from fewer producers

The perceived

to some degree

the

one side,

On

market power or dominance generate,

prices

produced.

the ability

resulting

must be considered.

ones that

of output

to society

sheet."

85 requires

which
likelihood

are viewed as

The Commission recognizes
arise

from collusive

mere price

or restrictive

and output

demonstrated
character

other

results

enterprise

considerations.

repeatedly

agreements

which might

activities

A willingness

that

go beyond

has been

by the Commission to include

of consumer welfare.

competitive

beneficial

the multi-dimensional

This has been done by accepting

which are likely

to result

anti-

in the production

of a

new or improved product.
In its
existing
cited

decisions

benefits

for consumers

repeatedly,

agreements,

process

Jaz-Peter

(69/242)

·
.
specia. 1 ization.

43

was made despite

the four

largest

It is
indicates

that

of Dusseldorf~

laundry

clock prices

(72/241)

that

manufacturers

The

joint

because

research

at better

and

to apply

development

27

This

were two of

in the world.

its

with substantial

soaps and detergents.

it

44

prices.

the Henkel-Colgate(72/241)

finns

of

of unproved

Henkel and Colgate

and Colgate-Palmolive,
their

of the

by the Commission because

to users

the fact

between

competition

in lower user prices.

would lead to the production

to note that

to coordinate

from enterprise

the specialization

to reduce

the Commission is willing

agreements

an agreement
certain

.detergent

important

restrictive
Henkel,

likely

which would be available

decision

One way

which has been exempted twice by the

The Henkel-Colgate

the arrangements

and

agreements.

to benefit

to result

agreemen~ was authorized

detergents

by business

or increase

application,

the potential

Agreements which limit

are most likely

was considered

development

prices.

but rationalize

production

Commission,

created

which consumers stand

is lower product

between firms,

believed

the Commission has identified

decision

balancing

logic

market power.

of New York, entered
projects

to

into

in the area of

At the time of the agreement,
detergent

industry

Proctor

was highly

oligopolistic.

and Gamble, Unilever,

for BO percent

of the total

Henkel,
sales.

approximately

37 percent

oligopolistic

market structure,

exemption

expectation

that

contracting
relevant

in its

parties
products

results

within

of research

products.

quantities
distributing,

created

a fair

Furthermore,

competition

agreements
however,
the public

case primarily

the licensees'

conswners. 45

The

expenses

of the likelihood

The result

of Bitter
so that

the

share of the

of a greater
the Comnission

was not j eopardized

be passed . to consumers
has found that
interest

The Commission exempted an exclusive

concentrate

between

because

the

in the

are one way in which the stipulation

The Comnission,

(78/253)

research

an

the Conununity.

prices

which may benefit

Campari

j oint

the agreement

and economic progress.

because

view,

from restrictive

satisfied.

that

had

the

did not have a dominant market position

Lower product
benefits

Despite

consumers would receive

supply of technically-improved
that,

accounted

results."

of the cooperation

explained

market.

on the grounds

The Collllllission believed
advantages

In the CommonMarket

the Commission gr.anted

the sharing

of rlgreater

in the soap and

Henkel and Colgate-Palmolive

should promote technical

Commission reasoned

structure

and Colgate-Palmolive

of the detergent

from prohibition

the parties

the market

sales

as much as reduced

license

agreement

the "restriction

efforts

and provided

Campari available

agreement
to consumers

consumers benefited

28

can be

there · are other

because

of the licensing

that

directly.

prices.

in the 1978

helped
a better

to
supply

was to increase
through

improved

to

the

The benefits

to consumers that

Clima-Chapee

(69/241)

of a greater

range of products,

46

consumers.

intended

potential

of lowering

substantial

production

the development

cooperation

application

and joint

was to design

an electrical

transmission

contained
because

provisions
it

limited

Nevertheless,
it

fulfilled

research

construction
the profits

research

in research

(68/319). 47

performance

as a result

•in an
The purpose

of

bus with

trade

and

The agreement

between member states

to one per EEC country.
an exemption

because

85 (3).
and economic progress
a bus with simplified

capabilities.

to operators
that

for

for specialization

the agreement

of Article

to produce

benefits

share of the

a new type of passenger

free

promoted technical

was likely

by the

an agreement

as well as manufacture.

the number of buyers

and better

a fair

and development

It provided

which restricted

judged to be the probability
more quickly

and market
system.

the conditions

(i.e.,

to a

of a new or improved product.

the Commission granted

The agreement
joint

to receive

for exemption by ACEC-Berliet

of labor

consumers then

competition

the Corranission authorized

the agreement

division

had the

in the CommonMarket have been authorized

In a 1968 decision
technical

for

conditioning

also

Conceivably,

or restricted

when consumers were likely
through

of air

and sale

prices.

which have limited

degree

choice

agreement

costs.

in its

in p~oduction

product

of production

from lower product

Agreements

benefits

and greater

in the specialization

to benefit

Comnission

were the increase

The rationalization

equipment

stood

decision

the Commission recognized

share

of motor coach lines)

was

technical

29

the

mechanical

Consumers'

a new product

of the joint

because

of

would become available
operation.

The decision

was the Commission's
consumer benefits
effects

first

in which it

that

an evaluation

could be based upon the probability

that

exempted other
benefit

agreements

exemption
circuit

decision,

(68/319)

because

from the production

manufacturers

beneficial

of the . likelihood

of a new product.

of switchgear

apparatus

for an agreement

to design,

breaker.

was likely

that

manufacture

Kingdom received

and sell

Commission also

noted in this

in a more durable

to put the switchgear
future

competition

commission

medical

justification
arrangements

consumers

from a new product.

agreement

was designed

treatment

of the impairment

to gain benefits

research
Davis

a new type

and efficient

to create

that

share of the benefits

resulting

to satisfy

this

decision.

(79/298)

to meet

research

by the
49

Once

of the

of benefits

to

and development
for the long-term

of blood circulation.

(3) assure · the Commission that

position

was sanctioned

a new medicine

parties

The

the EEC.

was the probability
The joint

of

for the agreement

for the authorization

from the development

It is essential

It is necessary

from outside

1979 Beecham/Parke

the primary

the potential

in the EEC in a better

product

to do joint

in its

anti-competitive

industry

in this

agreement

An

decision

an

the Commission decided

(77/160)

to result

consumers would

In 1977, the two leading

in the United

In Vacuum Interrupters

the agreement

th .e Comm:ission has

48
.
. b rea k er f or consumers at .a more reason abl e price.
·
c1.rcu1.t

again,

of

would result.

Since the ACEC-Berliet

that

decided

Thus, consumers stood

of a new medicine.

seeking

an exemption

consumers are likely

to receive

from the anti-canpetitive
condition

30

in all

under Article

cases,

85

a fair

arrangements.
and it may be a

sufficient

justification

situations.

(e.g.,

impose specific

review,

requirements

increases

an exemption

decision).

on the parties

are manifested.

are granted

effective

for

the Campari (78/253)

consumer benefits
exemptions

individually

Also,

for a specified

the probability

that

The Comnission may

involved
the fact

period

in sane

to insure

that

that

individual

of time and are subject

enterprises

will

to

make benefits

for consumers.

The preceding
Article

analysis

85 (3) provides

of the individual

a fundamental

link

model of competition

and EEC competition

that

which grants

this

provision,

practices,

is the statute

exemption

process

under

between the Schumpeter-Clark

policy.

exemptions

most indicative

It

is highly

possible

from the ban on restrictive

of the EEC attitude

towards

competition.
The exemptions

allowed

European approach
inherent
Rather

fear

that

to concerted

of concerted

than proscribing

the policy

attempts

receive

The cases

that

rationalization

joint

that

agreements

or production

production,

a fair

share

the historical

and concentrations.

No
is reflected.

of market structures

or activities,

way to promote competition

support

this

contention.

even if it

which are restrictive

by nature.

techniques.

the development
Joint

research

agreements

and economic advances.

31

The

a system of competition

of the production,

is to encourage

and ensure

of the benefits.

the EEC desires

and specialization

promote such technical

85 (3) manifest

or dominant positions

the existence

modernization

COllmUnity's approach
products

practices

were presented

is evidence

which promotes

practices

in a realistic

consumers

litigation

under Article

comes from
Also,

the

of new or improved
and · development,

are sanctioned

to

Even a new industry

(nuclear

fuel

76/248 case,
industry

reprocessing
despite

its

) was created
monopolistic

competition

a flexible,

the efficiency

is clearly

competition
policy.

exemplary

and is indicative

This approach

approach

of individual

of the EEC concern

for effective

is consistent

pragmatic

to EEC

in a

production

The process

of a rational,

the

50

the rules

of large-scale

stemming from modernization.

exemptions

it organized

realistic

The Commission and Court enforce

manner which encourages
benefits

because

manner at the European level.

85 (3) mandates

policy.

features,

Reprocessor

.

in the most rational

Thus, Article

in the United

and the

competition

with the Schumpeter-Clark

model of

competition.
Article

86 of the Rome Treaty

is directed

abuse of economic power by enterprises
It does not proscribe
states

that

position

within

trade

list

limits,

are undertaken
activity

within

between member states."

non-exhaustive
production

affects

of abusive
or restraints

prohibit

of a dominant
part

51

• The Article
(e.g.,

on technological

unfair

cartels

are not declared

Article

prohibit

shall

as it may
a

prices,

development)

if they

and the

between member states.

as the practices

the existence

of it

prohibits

by a firm with a dominant market position
trade

the

of market power, but

the CommonMarket insofar

practices

That which is not proscribed
competition

or acquisition

the CommonMarket or in a substantial
as incompatible

preventing

with a dominant market position.

"any abuse by one or more undertakings

be prohibited
affect

the existence

towards

that

by Article

86 is as important

are prohibited.

Article

of market power in any form.
illegal

the acquisition

by the statute.

of a dominant market

32

86 does not

Monopolies

Neither

to EEC

and

does the

position,

i.e.,

monopolizing.
limit

In other

the degree

words,

Article

86 is not designed

to prohibit

of market power in the EEC, but to control

or

the abuse of

economic power.
Enterprises

which restrict

can be granted
exemption
these

exemptions

clause

factors

statutes.

similar

policy

under Article

but meet certain

85 (3).

86.

86 the more flexible

has been more restrained

development

of Article

conditions

However, there

to 85 (3) under Article

have made Article

The result

substantive

competition

is no

To some extent
of the two treaty

enforcement

86 as an integral

and

rule

of competition

in EEC.
There are two main issues

in order

to apply Article

competition.

This issue

dominant position.
of competition

which must be resolved

86.

One consideration

involves

the legal

The second issue

because

a determination

is with structural

issue

involves

by the Conmission

of the existence

the behavioral

of a

aspects

must be made of whether an abuse

of power exists.
The determination
hinges

on whether

well-defined
determine
before

of whether

the firm has a significant

geographic
that

a firm's

relative

exists

size

expertise,

and the market position
decided

of influence

in a

The Commission nrust
·in a specific

market

is considered.

of a dominant market power is made in the EEC by

has over technological

Justice

market.

behavior

dominant market power

degree

the dominant position

of abusive

The determination

capital,

and product

a firm holds

the question

considering

a firm possesses

in Continental

or market
its

shar ,e, the coDD11and
it

control

over raw materials

of competitors.
Can (6/72)

that

The Court of
a dominant position

when a firm has the power to behave independently

cons id er i ng compet 1't ors,

pure h asers,

or supp 1·iers.
33

and

52

and act without

No exact

percentage

automatically

indicates

Brands

(76/353)

bananas

existed

of market
a dominant

it was determined
because

share

position.
that

even though the firm had less

relevant

market.

Article

86, nearly

constitute
those

effect

significant

80% of the relevant

market

degree

and the market

of control.

shares

that

which
in United

in the market for
of advantages

the -firm

45\ of the determined

than

However, in other

the requisite

cases

For example,

dominance

of the cumulative

enjoyed,

53

has been determined

cases
share

decided

under

was necessary

The table

to

below indicates

were considered

dominant.

THE CRITERIONOF DOMINANT
MARKETPOSITION UNDERARTICLE 86
Product

Firm

Market
Share

Re Gema (German Performers'
(71/224)
Rights Society

Supply of recording

Coumercial

aminobutanol-ethanebutol

100\

General Motors Continental
(75/267)

Issuance of "confornid,ty
certificates"

100\

Continental

Cari (72/6)

Meat tins

70-80\

Continental

Can (76/6)

Fish

80-90\

Continental

Can (72/6)

Metal caps

Sugar Cartel

(73/ 40)

Sugar beets

Sugar Cartel

(73/111)

Raw sugar

Solvents

The pattern
establish

market

(73/7)

of requiring

trns

Article

Commission and Court to establishing

50-55\

85\

percentage

significantly

86.

The approach
dominance

34

100\

90-95\

such a large

dominance has reduced

which may have infringed

services

of market

share

to

the number of cases
taken

by the

adds credibility

to the

belief

that

the EEC's main concern

market

structures.

The Court of Justice
assessment

position

metal

enterprise

considered

tops,

market
its

part

product

Can (72/6).

metal

it

and

of a Dutch

virtually

of the Comnon Market.

market

a dominant

containers

of 80 percent

86 because

not

of an accurate

possessed

for light

purchase

of Article

in a substantial

eliminated

The Commission

to be the German market for metal

competing metal

containers

were

in the analysis.

The appeal

to the Court of Justice

Commission's

decision.

"sufficiently

explain

54

markets

The Court felt
the fact

In particular,

for meat ~d

separately

respectively,

that

in an annulment of the

the Commission did not

and appraisalson

fish

tins,

and metal tops

of the general

the market . shares
the Court believed

or potential

resulted

. t:he [the decision]

the Commission fai _led to make clear

and independent

Thus, although

competition

was

why the

should be treated

market

for light

containers.

were 75, 85, and 55 percent,
the Commission should
from substitute

have considered

materials

such as

and glass.
By virtue

full

the Americar, fim

and thus only directly

included

plastic

market in Continental

and that

the relevant

containers,

existing

product
that

was a violation

competition

based. "

the importance

in the German national

certain

competition,

established

of the relevant

The Commission detenni.ned

is for effective

market

of the Court's

power analysis

decision

is required

in the Continental
to establish

Products

which are more than to a limited

included

within

product
position

the same market.

and geographic

market

extent

The selection

35

a

market dominance.
interchangeable

must be

of the appropriate

is a key in determining

exists.

Can case,

whether

a dominant

The result
case is that
Article

86 must include

of potential

and potential

action

broadens

the probability

of a firm being

the application

of Article

because

the competitive

market under
An

policy

is that

product

product

consumers,

the

market

area and reduces

in a dominant market position.

86 is more difficult

of suppliers,

Can (72/6)

competition.

in the relevant

it must be able to prove that

independent

product

for competitive

competition

substantially

in the Continental

of the relevant

actual

of the Court's

inclusion

decision

the determination

implication

analysis

of the Court's

Thus,

for the Com:nission,

an enterprise

can operate

as well as existing

totally

and future

competitors.
As stated,

there

are behavioral

in order

to apply Article

relevant

market

an exploitation
that

existence

86.

elements

of that

words, once dominance in a

In other

has been established

the Commission must decide whether

power has occurred.

criterion

abuse of power has taken place.

It is this

contrary

Of course

to Article

many types

of the competition

prohibited

have fallen

behavior

may ultimately

violate

rules.

To date,

the following
terms

however,

if an

which is

the

the abuses

categories:

an association

in charge of the exploitation

and conditions

upon members of
of music

(Re Gema 71/229):

a merger which has as its
competition

86.

to establish

abusive

of unfair

rights

of Article

necessary

the imposition

performing
2.

into

again be noted

86.

of behavior

intentions

l.

It should

of dominance is not an infringement

Market power is merely the first

considered

which must be determined

(Continental

effect

to substantially

Can 72/6);
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lessen

3.

a refusal
73/7)

to supply goods to a customer

(Commercial Solvents

1

4.

the charging

of excessive

prices

5.

discriminatory

pricing

6.

the imposition

of exclusive

(United

(General

Motors 75/26):

Brands 76/26);

purchase

obiligations

(Hoffman-La Roche 76/85):
7.

a disciminatory

reduction

(European Sugar Cartel

The varied
heretofore
Article

nature

suggests
86.

the capability

to certain

customers

73/50).

of the abusive

The definition

been determined

in supplies

behavior

proscribed

of a flexible

approach

of what constitutes

on a case by case basis.

in the cases
in applying

an abuse has essentially

Such an open-ended

abuse may serve the needs of the Community well.

The result

approach

that

is that

"one is ieft

where the Commission finds

with the conclusion

them to exist.

firms with market power in their
.

an d competitors.

This

relations

of Article
competition

indicates

[can be] a deterrent

to prevent

of dominant market power under Article
for regulating

dominant market
86 . and indicative

restrictive

structures,

86.

to

purchasers,

of the control

or eliminate

However, the

p.ractices,

is evidenced

rather

than

in the enforcement

of 'abuse of power

principle.

Summary and Implications
An

of this

55

Community preference
prohibiting

examination
that

to

abuses occur

with suppliers,

In sununary, the Conmunity has the ability
the abuses

approach

of the competition

the Community attempts

for Future
policy
through

37

Policy

implemented
its

policy

in the EEC
to achieve

supranational

economic objectives,

economic power.
that

potential

The balancing
social

proved production
organization)

techniques,

which imperfectly

competition

between static

in this
practices

authorities

that

to foster

of anti-competitive

the basic

contributions
In other

to balance

indicates

that

provides

a logical

theoretical

tion

to
words,

of dynamic progressiveness.
policy

competition

the Schumpeter-Clark

is a pragmatic

and provide

benefits

Furthermore,

and explana-

of the policy.

The conclusions
future

EEC policy
Presently,

firms;

decisions,

markets

study have realistic
and for other

IBM and Reynolds Tobacco Co.

investigation

of abusing

implications

research

for

directions.

the practices

of two U.S.

IBM has been accused

by its

its

dominant market

position.

is concerned

with the impact

on EEC tobacco

of the U.S. firm's

International

Implications

the EEC is investigating

European competitors
Reynolds

of this

Policy

purchase

of 22 percent

of London.
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the

model of competition

framework for the analysis

Future

by

the tradeoff

to the CommonMarket from a dynamic economic system.
research

standard

is economic per-

progress.

EEC competition

innovational

im-

forms of industrial

emphasizes

and the benefits

This study concludes

new products,

are judged

attempt

use of

employ requires

(e.g.,

study that

and technological

efficiency

designed

authorities

to the costs

which primarily

enhancement

canmunity

policy

in relation

competitive

a criterion

efficiency

that

the abusive

and more efficient

It was resolved

formance;

logic

and economic benefits

be measured

activities.

and control

in Rothmans

The

European manufacturers
refusal

to disclose

of computer

technical

details

and selling

with IBM computers.

IBM has countered

diminished.

the company's

American are minimal,
the proposed
be useful
decision

technological

progress

if their

presented

Assuredly,

that

will

be

precedents

in this

and

study can

the Commission's

hinge upon the firm's

and the benefits

lead

of the firms being

of competition

of policy

an outcome.

in the IBM case will

that

ramifications

economic principles

IBM's

are plug-compatible

to be innovative

the interpretation

for predicting
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